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Abstract
This paper studies an optimal asset allocation problem for a surplus-driven financial
institution facing a Value-at-Risk (VaR) or an Expected Shortfall (ES) constraint correspond-
ing to a non-concave optimization problem under constraints. We obtain the closed-form
optimal wealth with the ES constraint as well as with the VaR constraint respectively, and
explicitly calculate the optimal trading strategy for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility functions. We find that both VaR and ES-based regulation can effectively reduce
the probability of default for a surplus-driven financial institution. However, the liability
holders’ benefits cannot be fully protected under either VaR- or ES-based regulation. In ad-
dition, we show that the VaR and ES-based regulation can induce the same optimal portfolio
choice for a surplus-driven financial institution. This differs from the conclusion drawn in
Basak and Shapiro [2001] where the financial institution aims at maximizing the expected
utility of the total assets, and ES provides better loss protection.
Keywords Value-at-Risk · Expected Shortfall · Optimal investment strategy · Non-concave
utility maximization
1 Introduction
In order to protect financial institutions’ liability holders, a financial regulation mainly serves
to ensure the safety of the financial institution, and consequently the stability of the financial
system as a whole (Koch-Medina and Munari [2016]). It is common that a financial institution
is motivated to achieve a higher surplus, but this surplus-driven investment behavior might
endanger the liability holders’ benefits once default occurs, especially for a company with limited
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liability. However, the liability holders of financial institutions usually have no control over the
investment decisions of the company. Due to the high cost of a personal supervision, the liability
holders mostly rely on the financial regulator to protect their benefits .
Value-at-Risk (VaR), defined as the loss that is exceeded under a given probability within
a given horizon, has been a dominant standard risk measure used for regulation for the last
several decades, e.g. for the European insurance regulation Solvency II and Basel II. Recently,
Expected Shortfall (ES), defined as the expected loss conditional on the loss exceeding the VaR
level, has been considered as an alternative of VaR and become the underlying risk measure
for some regulatory frameworks, see for instance the new banking regulation Basel III and the
Swiss Solvency Test. This trend has given rise to an increasing number of debates on VaR
and ES, see for instance Embrechts et al. [2014] and the references therein. The risk measure
proposed in the financial regulation, e.g. VaR or ES, is used by financial institution to calculate
the solvency capital requirement and decide if a given portfolio is acceptable. Hence, the risk
measure provides information on the risk of a portfolio while serving as a constraint on the
financial institutions’ choices of investment strategies. In this study, we aim to investigate the
optimal investment strategy of a surplus-driven financial institution facing a VaR or an ES
constraint, and examine whether VaR or ES-based financial regulation can protect the liability
holders’ benefits.
The seminal paper by Basak and Shapiro [2001] solves the optimal asset allocation problem
under a VaR- or an ES-based constraint, assuming that the financial institution aims at maxi-
mizing the expected utility of the total assets. Mathematically, this corresponds to a concave
maximization problem under constraints. They find that the optimal investment strategy un-
der the ES constraint is less risky compared to the one under the VaR constraint. Moreover,
the optimal investment strategy under the VaR constraint is even riskier than the benchmark
(unconstrained) strategy in the worst financial scenarios. Therefore, their results suggest that
ES is a better risk measure.
In order to emphasize the surplus-driven characteristic of the financial institution, we
explicitly distinguish the equity and liability in the asset structure and assume that the financial
institutions make investment decisions maximizing the expected utility of the surplus. To be
consistent and comparable with the existing results, we consider the same definition of the risk
constraints as Basak and Shapiro [2001]. Hence, our model can be seen as a counterpart model
of Basak and Shapiro [2001] but in a non-concave environment. However, the conclusion in our
setting differs sharply. Specifically, our findings and contributions are as follows.
- Firstly, we obtain the analytical solution under both VaR and ES constraints (Theorems 4.1
and 4.2), respectively. The analytical solutions to the optimization problem under constraints
considering a non-concave utility function are not completely explored in the literature. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to provide the analytical solution under an
ES constraint in a non-concave environment. There are some recent studies investigating the
non-concave optimization under a VaR constraint (Nguyen and Stadje [2020], Dong and Zheng
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[2020]). Unlike the unique type of the solution to a constrained concave optimization problem,
there are several types of solutions to a constrained non-concave optimization problem (e.g.,
two-region, three-region, and four-region solutions), depending on the relationship between
the given regulatory threshold (L in the constraint) and the critical point (the liability level in
the payoff function of the equity holder or the reference level in the S-shape utility function)
where the utility function is discontinuous. Independent of the recent research, we provide the
complete solutions under the ES as well as VaR constraint allowing for a random relationship
between the regulatory threshold L and the debt level. In addition, we explicitly provide the
condition for the existence of different types of solutions, i.e., we calculate the interval of the
corresponding initial wealth.
- Secondly, we find that both VaR and ES constraints reduce the probability of default for a
surplus-driven financial company. If the financial institution aims at maximizing the ex-
pected utility of the total assets, the ES constraint effectively restricts the tail-risk-seeking
behavior, while a VaR constraint induces the financial company to choose an even riskier
strategy compared to the benchmark (unconstrained strategy). However, if the financial insti-
tution aims at maximizing the expected utility of the surplus, a VaR and an ES constraint both
lead to a less risky strategy compared to the benchmark (unconstrained strategy) and reduce
the probability of default. In fact, the benchmark (unconstrained) solution of a surplus-
driven financial institution shows a gambling behavior. Specifically, the financial institution
will completely default (by holding zero terminal wealth) in the worst financial scenarios in
order to obtain a higher surplus in a booming market. Thus, in the default scenarios, the
liability holders as well as the equity holders are left with nothing. However, by introducing
a VaR or an ES constraint, the probability of a default is reduced (actually to the level of the
regulatory level α in the risk constraint), but the terminal wealth in the default scenario is
still zero. This means on the one hand, the probability of default is reduced because of the
regulation, and on the other hand, the benefits of liability holders in the default area are not
really protected. Koch-Medina and Munari [2016] claim that an ES-based test does not distin-
guish the interests of liability holders and shareholders by only looking at the tail behavior of
a portfolio,1 and hence cannot protect the liability holders from the default risk. They argue
that the liability holders are more interested in the default area rather than the tail-behavior
of a financial institution, and that liability holders being surplus-indifferent (i.e., the surplus
will not increase the liability holders’ utility) is not yet considered by the financial regulation.
Our results verify this argument by explicitly considering the surplus-driven characteristic
of the financial company.
- Last but not least, a by-product of obtaining analytical solutions is that we find that a VaR
and an ES constraint induce the same optimal investment strategy (Corollary 5.1), which is
1Tail behavior includes both the surplus-driven behavior in a booming financial market and the default behavior
in the worst financial state.
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different than the conclusion in Basak and Shapiro [2001]. The worst financial scenarios under
an ES constraint in Basak and Shapiro [2001] are determined not only by the exogenously
given regulation level but also by the financial institution’s risk aversion and initial wealth.
However, the worst financial scenarios under an ES constraint in our model only depend on
the given risk constraint like in the VaR case. In addition, the optimal investment strategies
under both constraints default completely (by holding zero terminal wealth) in the worst
financial scenarios. These two observations are the technical reasons for the equivalence. The
economical implication is that ES is not superior to VaR in restricting the surplus-driven
financial company’s tail-risk-seeking behavior.
In addition to the non-linear function of the surplus considered in our setting, the non-concavity
broadly exists in the optimization problem, for instance, the option-payoff to the fund manager
(Carpenter [2000], Kouwenberg and Ziemba [2007]) and the S-shape utility function by differ-
entiating gains and losses (Berkelaar et al. [2004], He and Zhou [2011]). Although we consider a
specific setting, e.g. the asset allocation problem for a surplus-driven financial company facing
a VaR or an ES constraint, our results and techniques are general enough to be extended to
other non-concave optimization problems. A limitation of our work might be that the model
is analysed in a complete financial market. We leave the relaxation of this limitation as a topic
for future research.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the second section describes the financial
market and the basic model setup. Section 3 contains some background on the unconstrained
non-concave maximization problem which is used later as the benchmark case. Section 4 provides
the optimal solution under a VaR or an ES constraint, respectively. Section 5 establishes the
equivalence result. Section 6 computes the optimal trading strategies with a CRRA utility
function and examines the properties of the optimal strategies analytically and numerically.
The last section concludes. All technical proofs are provided in the E-companion.
1.1 Related Research
Our work is related to several areas of research, for instance the concave/non-concave optimiza-
tion with/without constraints and the studies regarding the comparison between VaR and ES.
A large stream of literature compares VaR and ES by investigating the statistical properties
of them. Some studies show that ES is notoriously sensitive to outliers (Cont et al. [2010],
Kou et al. [2013]) and hence contrary to VaR, is not a robust measure. Furthermore, VaR is
elicitable, while ES is not (Ziegel [2016]). Some studies analyse the two risk measures from
axiomatic properties (Artzner et al. [1999], Acerbi et al. [2001], Acerbi and Tasche [2002] and
Wang and Zitikis [2019]) and claim that ES being a coherent risk measure is superior to VaR
which is not sub-additive. After the seminal paper by Basak and Shapiro [2001], Cuoco et al.
[2008] consider VaR and ES dynamically in continuous time, assuming that the portfolio weights
are unchanged for the time interval over which the regulatory capital is computed, and show
that VaR and ES will induce the same optimal strategy of a financial institution maximizing
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the expected utility of combined wealth of equity and policyholders. Shi and Werker [2012] use
numerical methods to verify that the difference between the VaR and ES-strategy in the worst
financial states will be reduced significantly if the risk constraint is re-evaluated multiple times
before the investment horizon, assuming the maximizing utility is concave. These representa-
tive studies investigate the influence of VaR and ES constraints on the financial institution,
aiming at maximizing the expected utility considering the total assets, while the study on
the effect of regulation on the surplus-driven financial company by explicitly looking at the
investment strategy is still missing in the literature. Our paper aims to fill this gap. The study
closest to us is Armstrong and Brigo [2019]. They argue that VaR and ES are inefficient in
restricting the typical non-concave optimizer with an S-shape utility function by showing that
the unconstrained solution coincides with the constrained solution assuming the wealth can take
arbitrarily negative large values. In our model, the negative utility is bounded from below and
we do not allow the wealth to be negative, which is the key difference between our models.2
Moreover, our analytical solutions also contain the case where the constrained solution coincides
with the unconstrained solution (i.e. VaR and ES are inefficient) if the initial wealth of the
financial institution is too high or the regulation is not sufficiently strict, but this is not always
the case.
1.2 Definitions of risk constraints
There are many versions of definitions of VaR and ES, depending on the underlying probability
space and the assumption of the loss distribution. Therefore, in this subsection we clarify the
definitions of risk constraints used in this paper and explain the differences to the conventional
definitions of VaR and ES in statistical studies.
From an axiomatic or statistical point of view, Value-at-Risk is defined as
V aRα(Y ) := − inf{y|P (Y ≤ y) ≤ α}, (1.1)
where Y denotes a loss. Hence, VaR denotes a quantile value with respect to a loss distribution.
Correspondingly, Expected Shortfall is defined as
ESα(Y ) =
1
α
∫ α
0
V aRβ(Y )dβ. (1.2)
Therefore, ES denotes the expectation of the loss conditioning on that the loss has exceeded the
VaR level. The definition of ES is closely related to VaR, and thus ES is sometimes referred as
average VaR or tail VaR.
The above definitions (1.1) and (1.2) of VaR and ES are conventional definitions used in
axiomatic or statistical studies on risk measures, see for instance Artzner et al. [1999], Acerbi
and Tasche [2002] and Wang and Zitikis [2019]. From the axiomatic or statistical point of view,
2These assumptions are important to obtain the conclusion in Armstrong and Brigo [2019] For the detailed
proof, see Armstrong and Brigo [2019].
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VaR and ES are a number or a value that describes the risk of a given portfolio. In this paper,
we investigate the optimal asset allocation problem of a financial institution facing a VaR or
an ES constraint. Hence, we assume that VaR and ES exhibit given and provide the optimal
portfolio choice that achieves the acceptable risk level.
The VaR constraint in this paper is defined as
P (XT ≤ L) ≤ α, (1.3)
where XT is a random variable denoting the terminal wealth, L is a given regulatory threshold
and α denotes the regulatory confidence level. If the initial wealth of the financial institution is
x0, then by satisfying (1.3), the loss of this portfolio is at most L− x0 with probability 1− α.
Further, the ES constraint is defined as
E[ξT (L−XT )1XT<L] ≤ , (1.4)
where ξT denotes the unique state price density or pricing kernel in a complete financial market
and  is a given number that captures the acceptable level of expected loss. We take (1.4) from
Basak and Shapiro [2001] that is also called Limited Expected Loss constraint. By satisfying
(1.4), the discounted tail expected loss of the optimal portfolio is restricted within an acceptable
level.3
Since we work in a complete financial market, the pricing kernel or state price density ξT
is unique, which implies that the optimal portfolios under discounted expected loss constraint
or the expected loss constraint only differ slightly in magnitude. We remark that considering
the discounted expected shortfall (1.4) simplifies the proof but does not change the essence of
the optimization problem. For a discussion on the choice of the risk constraint under the risk
neutral measure Q or the physical measure P , see Gu et al. [2019].
In addition, the expected shortfall constraint (1.4) denotes the tail expected loss conditioning
on that the loss has exceeded L−x0 which is the regulated loss level of the VaR constraint (1.3).
We remark that the tail expected loss captured by (1.4) does not necessarily correspond to the
tail loss conditioning on the loss exceeding the α-quantile of the portfolio loss. However, with
a similar technique, the problem can be solved as well if the conditional expectation in (1.4) is
changed to condition on the loss exceeding the α-quantile. We further remark that as long as the
regulatory threshold L is greater or equal than the implicit VaR-level of the optimal portfolio,
the risk constraints (1.3) and (1.4) are binding. For the detailed discussion on the existence of
the optimal solution, see the E-companion to this paper.
3Note that the expectation in (1.4) is taken under the unique risk neutral measure Q in the complete financial
market. For more on the risk neutral valuation, see for instance section 7 in Bjo¨rk [2009].
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2 The Model
2.1 The financial market
We assume a complete financial market in continuous time without transaction costs that con-
tains one traded risk free asset S0 (the bank account) and m traded risky assets denoted
by the stochastic processes S = (S1, · · · , Sm)′ .4 We fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F =
(Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ), T <∞. Denote by Q the unique local martingale measure in the complete finan-
cial market and define by ξT :=
S0(0)dQ
S0(T )dP
the state price density process. Throughout the paper
we assume that ξT is atom-less. Here ξT is the Arrow-Debreu value per probability unit of a
security which pays out 1$ at time T if scenario ω happens, and 0 else. As this value is high in
a recession and low in prosperous time, ξT (ω) has the property of directly reflecting the overall
state of the economy. Therefore, the functional relationship between the optimal wealth and ξT
will be used as an interpretation for some of the results.
The financial institution endowed with an initial capital x0 chooses an investment strategy
that we describe in terms of the fraction pii(t) of the total wealth invested in the ith risky
asset at time t. The remaining wealth is invested in the risk free asset and the strategy is self-
financing. We assume that pi(t) = (pi1(t), · · · , pim(t)) is adaptive with respect to the filtration
F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ]. The wealth process related to a strategy pi(t) starting with an initial wealth x0
is then given by
Xpit = X0 +
m∑
i=0
∫ t
0
pii(s)dSi(s) = X0 +
∫ t
0
pi(s)dS(s), X0 = x0 > 0. (2.1)
In a complete financial market, choosing a self-financing trading strategy pi is equivalent to
choosing a terminal wealth XpiT which can be financed by x0. The set of attainable terminal
wealth is defined by
X := {XpiT is FT -measurable, replicable, non-negative andE[ξTXpiT ] = x0}.
From now on we omit the dependence of XT on pi.
2.2 The model setup with a VaR or an ES constraint
In this section, we introduce the model setup with a VaR or an ES constraint. We consider
a financial institution operating on [0, T ], T < ∞. At time 0, the company receives an initial
contribution E0 from the equity holders, and an amount D0 from the debt holders. Consequently,
the initial asset value of the company is given by x0 = E0 +D0.
We assume that the benefits to the debt holders are paid out as a lump sum at time T . The
defined benefits can be represented as the initial contributions of the debt holders accumulated
with a (nominal) rate of return, i.e., DT = D0e
∫ T
0 gsds, with DT ≥ D0e
∫ T
0 rsds where rs is the
4Here S is an m-dimensional vector and ′ denotes the transposed sign.
7
risk-free rate, if there is no default at maturity, i.e., XT > DT . In case of default at maturity,
i.e., XT ≤ DT , XT is paid out at maturity. More compactly, the debt holders’ terminal payoff
can be presented as
ϕL(XT ) = min(DT , XT ).
Note that if DT ≤ D0e
∫ T
0 rsds, the debt holders are better off by investing the money D0 fully
in the risk free asset.
The surplus function of the financial institution, which can also be considered as the payoff
to the equity holders, is determined residually by
ϕE(XT ) = XT − ϕL(XT ) = max(XT −DT , 0) =: (XT −DT )+.
A surplus-driven financial institution invests the total proceedings x0 in a diversified portfolio
of the risky and the risk free assets as defined in Section 2.1. Further, we denote the financial
institution’ utility function by U and assume that the utility function is defined on the non-
negative real line, strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable and satisfies
the usual Inada and asymptotic elasticity (AE) conditions,
U
′
(0) = lim
x→0
U
′
(x) =∞; U ′(∞) = lim
x→∞U
′
(x) = 0; lim
x→∞ sup
xU
′
(x)
U(x)
< 1.
In addition, we assume U(0) = 0.
Remark 1. If U(0) ∈ (−∞,∞), we know that adding a constant to the utility function will
not change the essence of the optimization problem. If U(0) = −∞, one may see from the proof
in the E-companion that the optimal terminal wealth is more than the debt level in any state
implying an infinite liability company. In this model, we consider a limited liability company
allowing for default, and therefore exclude the case U(0) = −∞.
Figure 1 is an illustrative example for the utility function of a surplus-driven company, where
the utility level equals zero when the wealth level is below the debt level.
The optimal asset allocation problem of the surplus-driven financial institution under an ES-
or a VaR-regulatory constraint can be described as follows in Problems 1 and 2.
Problem 1. The ES-constrained optimization problem is defined as
max
XT∈X
E[U((XT −DT )+)],
subject to
E[ξT (L−XT )1XT<L] ≤ , E[XT ξT ] ≤ x0,
where L is the given regulatory threshold and  is the maximal allowed expected shortfall, and
can be chosen as a percentage of the initial wealth. In addition, 1 is the indicator function, i.e.,
1A is 1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise.
8
Figure 1: The non-concave utility of the equity holders.
Problem 2. The VaR-constrained optimization problem is defined as
max
XT∈X
E[U((XT −DT )+)],
subject to
P (XT < L) ≤ α, E[XT ξT ] ≤ x0,
where α ∈ [0, 1].
The VaR constraint is interpreted as a requirement that the terminal wealth is beyond the
regulatory threshold L with a confidence level 1−α, i.e., P (XT ≥ L) ≥ 1−α, which implies the
loss of the portfolio is at most x0 −L with probability 1− α. For example, Solvency II requires
an insurance company to hold enough solvency capital such that it can meet its obligations to
its policyholders with a confidence level of 99.5% (i.e., α = 0.005) over a 12-month period.
In practice, the regulatory boundary is often set at or close to the debt level DT . However,
if the asset’s value falls below this level, this will not automatically entail liquidation of an
insurance company, as a grace period is often allowed for recovery5. In this sense, the effective
regulatory threshold is lower, i.e., L < DT . In subsequent cases, for completeness we will analyse
both L > DT and L ≤ DT . Similarly, the ES constraint is interpreted as a limitation on the
average of the severe losses given that the loss is already above the regulatory VaR-threshold,
i.e., E[ξT (L−XT )1XT<L] ≤ .
3 Background on the non-concave optimization problem
In this section we introduce some background regarding the general non-concave optimization
problem. Then, we will provide the solution to the unconstrained case in our model as the
5See Broeders and Chen (2010) for a formal analysis of the impact of recovery periods.
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benchmark solution.
3.1 Preliminaries
In solving the non-concave optimization problem, the technique commonly used is the concav-
ification of the utility function, see Carpenter [2000] and Reichlin [2013]. However, this is not
sufficient to solve the non-concave optimization problem with additional constraints, see Dai
et al. [2019]. In our analysis, we will use a piecewise Lagrangian approach to solve the con-
strained non-concave optimization problem. Below we first recall the concept of a conjugate
function and then give some of its properties in our setting.
Definition 3.1. For a fixed and positive d, consider a concave utility function U(x− d) defined
on (d,∞) which satisfies the Inada and AE condition. For a given positive λ, we define the
conjugate function c(y) := sup
x>d
{U(x−d)−xλy} = U(x(y)−d)−U ′(x(y)−d)x(y) = U(I(λy))−
λyI(λy)− λyd, where I is the inverse function of the first derivative of U and y > 0.
Lemma 3.1. i) c(y) is decreasing in y.
ii) For each positive and fixed d, there exists a dˆ such that U(dˆ− d)/dˆ = U ′(dˆ− d). We call dˆ
the tangent point. In addition, we have that y(dˆ) := U
′
(dˆ− d)/λ and c(y(dˆ)) = 0. In other
words, y(dˆ) is the unique zero root of the conjugate function c(y).
iii) For positive λ, λ2, l and d, define a new conjugate function c
∗(y) := sup
x>d
{U(x− d)− xλy +
λy λ2lλ } = U(I(λy)) − λyI(λy) − λyd + λy λ2lλ . Then c∗(y) has a zero root if and only if
λ2l
λ − d =: s < 0.
Note that U(x−d)−xλy represents a part of the piecewise Lagrangian we employ to solve the
optimization problem. The conjugate function describes the least upper hyperplane of this static
Lagrangian. The second statement introduces the concept of the tangent point. We can see that
the tangent point dˆ does not depend on λ and y. More interestingly, the conjugate function
attains 0 at the tangent point. Due to the monotonicity of the conjugate function given in the
first statement, we can determine whether the conjugate of the Lagrangian is positive or negative
with a given y. In addition, we can construct the concave envelope with the tangent point, see
Figure 2 below. Statement iii) defines a more complex conjugate function and introduces the
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a zero root. We will see in the E-companion
that this function is useful to solve the ES-constrained problem.
We provide the proof of Lemma 3.1 in the E-companion.
3.2 The benchmark solution
The general unconstrained non-concave optimization problem has been solved in Reichlin [2013].
Hence, in order to highlight the effect of the additional constraint, we provide the solution to
the unconstrained problem in our model without proof.
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Figure 2: The non-concave utility function and the corresponding concave envelope.
Problem 3. The unconstrained optimization problem is
max
XT∈X
E[U((XT −DT )+)], subject to E[XT ξT ] ≤ x0.
Throughout the reminder of the paper we assume that for any λ ∈ (0,∞), we have that
E[U(I(λξT ))] < ∞ and E[ξT I(λξT )] < ∞. The benchmark solution is then given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal solution to Problem 3 is given by
XBT = (I(λBξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
, (3.1)
where D̂T is the tangent point with respect to DT (see Lemma 3.1), ξ
D̂T = U
′
(D̂T −DT )/λB,
and λB is obtained by solving E[X
B
T ξT ] = x0.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal terminal wealth as a function of the state price density in the
benchmark case where the dashed line denotes the case of a surplus-driven company and the
dotted line denotes the case of a company caring for the total asset instead of only the surplus.
Figure 3 shows the gambling behavior of a surplus-driven financial company that chooses to
completely default (by holding zero terminal wealth) in worse financial scenarios in order to
invest more in a booming market and obtain a higher surplus.
4 Non-concave optimization under an ES or a VaR constraint
In this section we solve the non-concave optimization problem with an ES or a VaR constraint,
respectively. We will see later that the correspondence between the debt level DT and the regu-
latory threshold L has a significant influence on the constrained optimal solution. As mentioned
11
Figure 3: The optimal terminal wealth of a financial institution without constraints.
This figure plots the optimal terminal wealth of a financial institution without constraints. We plot the case of a surplus-
driven company as well as the case of a company maximizing the expected utility of the total asset with other parameters
unchanged. The basic parameters are chosen according to Table 1 in Section 5.
previously, a higher L implies a stricter regulation. Usually the regulatory threshold L is set
below and close at the debt level DT in practice. In the following, for completeness, we consider
both cases: L ≤ DT and L > DT .
4.1 The non-concave optimization under an ES constraint
We firstly consider the ES-constrained optimization problem in this section, namely,
max
XT∈X
E
[
U
(
(XT −DT )+
)]
, s.t. E[ξT (L−XT )1XT<L] ≤ , E[XT ξT ] ≤ x0.
Typically, the solution to the constrained problems highly depends on the initial wealth. If the
initial wealth is low, the problem might be infeasible. If the initial wealth is sufficiently large,
the risk constraint is not binding and the solution to the constrained problem coincides with the
one to the unconstrained problem. On the other hand, there exists a region of the initial wealth,
within which the risk constraint is binding. Note that in this specific ES-constrained problem,
there is no feasible solution if x0 < x
min
0 := Le
− ∫ T0 rsds − . The reason is that with such a low
initial wealth level, the expected shortfall is unavoidably larger than .
The solution to the ES-constrained optimization problem (Problem 1) is given in the fol-
lowing theorem. Various cases are distinguished according to the relation between the debt level
DT and the regulatory threshold L, and the available initial wealth.
Theorem 4.1. a) If L ≤DT , the optimal solution to Problem 1 is:
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i) When xmin0 ≤ x0 < x10 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −DT )ξT /ξ¯) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯ ]
XES = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯ if ξ¯ ≤ ξL˜ , (4.1)
XES = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξL˜
+ L1
ξL˜ ≤ξT<ξ¯ if ξ¯ > ξ
L˜
 , (4.2)
ii) when x0 ≥ x10
XES = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
, (4.3)
where ξL˜ = U
′
(L˜− (DT − L))/λ, L˜ is the tangent point with respect to DT − L, ξ¯ is
defined through E[LξT1ξT≥ξ¯ ] = , ξ
D̂T = U
′
(D̂T −DT )/λ and λ is obtained by solving
E[ξTX
ES
T ] = x0.
b) If DT < L ≤ D̂T , the optimal solution to Problem 1 is:
i) When xmin0 ≤ x0 < x20 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −DT )ξT /ξ¯) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯ ]
XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯ if ξ¯ < ξ, (4.4)
XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ
+ L1ξ

≤ξT<ξ¯ if ξ¯ ≥ ξ, (4.5)
ii) when x0 ≥ x20
XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
, (4.6)
where ξ¯ is defined through E[LξT1ξT≥ξ¯ ] = , ξ
D̂T = U
′
(D̂T−DT )/λ and λ is obtained
by solving E[ξTX
ES
T ] = .
c) If L > D̂T , the optimal solution to Problem 1 is:
i) When xmin0 ≤ x0 < x30 := E
[
ξT (I(λ¯ξT ) +DT )1ξT λ¯<U ′ (D̂T−DT )
]
XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ
+ L1
ξ

≤ξT<ξ¯ + (I((λ − λ

2)ξT ) +DT )1
ξ¯≤ξT<ξD̂T
, (4.7)
ii) when x0 ≥ x30
XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
, (4.8)
where ξ

= U
′
(L−DT )
λ
, ξ¯ = U
′
(L−DT )
λ−λ2 , ξ
D̂T
 =
U
′
(D̂T−DT )
λ−λ2 , λ and λ

2 are obtained by
solving the equations E[ξTX
ES ] = x0 and E[ξT (L − XES)1XES<L] = . In addition,
λ¯ is determined by the identity E[ξT (L − I(λ¯ξT ) − DT )1U ′ (D̂T−DT )>ξT λ¯≥U ′ (L−DT ) +
ξTL1ξT λ¯≥U ′ (D̂T−DT )] = .
Remark 2. When the regulatory threshold is lower than the debt level, i.e., L < DT , and the
initial wealth level is relatively small, the three-region constrained solution applies. With an in-
creasing initial wealth level, the three-region solution converges to the two-region solution. With
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a continuously increasing initial wealth level, the two-region solution converges to the bench-
mark (unconstrained) solution. The three-region solution is a more passive strategy compared
to the two-region solution in the sense that the non-concave optimizer is forced to insure a large
region by holding the regulatory threshold L while the surplus in this region is zero and hence
all the terminal wealth will go to the debt holder. A wealthier surplus-driven company with a
higher initial wealth is capable of investing in a larger region. In this case, the company reduces
the region of a complete default to meet the risk constraint. Note that the case in which the
regulatory threshold is equal to the debt level (L = DT ) represents a special case. Independent
of the initial wealth level, only a two-region solution results. When DT < L < D̂T , the situ-
ation is similar. From Theorem 3.1, we know that the unconstrained terminal wealth is either
larger than the tangent point D̂T or is 0. When the regulatory threshold L is set smaller than
the tangent point, the regulation forces the financial institution to redistribute the wealth in the
default region. When L > D̂T , the terminal wealth shows a similar structure as in Basak and
Shapiro [2001] except for the worst financial states where the terminal wealth jumps to 0.
4.2 The non-concave optimization under a VaR constraint
A financial institution operating under a VaR constraint faces the problem
max
XT∈X
E
[
U
(
(XT −DT )+
)]
, s.t. P (XT < L) ≤ α, E[XT ξT ] ≤ x0.
Note that if x0 < x
min
0 := E[LξT1ξT<ξ¯α ] where ξ¯α is defined through P (ξT > ξ¯α) = α, there is
no feasible solution.
The solution to the VaR-constrained optimization problem (Problem 2) is given in the
following theorem. The proof is less complex than in the case of an ES constraint and can be
found in the E-companion.
Theorem 4.2. a) If L ≤DT , the optimal solution to Problem 2 is:
i) When xmin0 ≤ x0 < x40 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −DT )ξT /ξ¯α) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α ]
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α if ξ
L˜ ≥ ξ¯α, (4.9)
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξL˜
+ L1
ξL˜≤ξT<ξ¯α if ξ
L˜ < ξ¯α, (4.10)
ii) when x0 ≥ x40
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
, (4.11)
where ξL˜ = U
′
(L˜ − (DT − L))/λα, L˜ is the tangent point with respect to DT − L,
ξD̂T = U
′
(D̂T −DT )/λα and λα is defined via the budget constraint E[XV aRT ξT ] = x0.
b) If DT < L ≤ D̂T , the optimal solution to Problem 2 is:
14
i) when xmin0 ≤ x0 < x50 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −DT )ξT /ξ¯α) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α ]
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξα
+ L1ξ
α
≤ξT<ξ¯α if ξ¯α ≥ ξα, (4.12)
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α if ξ¯α < ξα, (4.13)
where ξ
α
= U(L − DT )/λα, ξD̂T = U ′(D̂T − DT )/λα and λα is obtained by solving
E[XV aRT ξT ] = x0.
ii) When x0 ≥ x50
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
. (4.14)
c) If L > D̂T , the optimal solution to Problem 2 is:
i) when xmin0 ≤ x0 < x60 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(L−DT )ξT /ξ¯α) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α ]
XV aRT = (I(λαξT )+DT )1ξT<ξα
+L1ξ
α
≤ξT<ξ¯α+(I(λαξT )+DT )1ξ¯α≤ξT<ξD̂T if ξ¯α < ξ
D̂T ,
(4.15)
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξα
+ L1ξ
α
≤ξT<ξ¯α if ξ¯α ≥ ξD̂T . (4.16)
ii) When xmin0 ≤ x0 < x60 := E[ξT (I(U
′
(L−DT )ξT /ξ¯α) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯α ]
XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
. (4.17)
Remark 3. Note that when L ≤ D̂T , the VaR-constrained solution has a similar structure as
the ES-constrained solution. Later on we will show that it is possible to establish the equivalence
between a VaR constraint and an ES constraint when L ≤ D̂T . While L > D̂T , the VaR-
constrained solution is similar to Basak and Shapiro [2001] except for the worst financial states
where the default happens. This difference in the worst financial scenarios arises from the
gambling behavior of a surplus-driven company that defaults in the worst financial scenarios
in order to gain a larger surplus in a booming market. This further implies that a VaR or ES-
based regulation is not capable to prevent the gambling behavior of a surplus-driven company
completely.
5 Equivalence between an ES- and a VaR-constraint
Apparently, when the initial wealth is sufficiently high, the resulting constrained solution is
identical to the unconstrained solution since then the ES or VaR constraint is always satisfied.
As a consequence, there is a natural equivalence between the ES- and VaR-constrained solution
for the “trivial” case. In this section we focus on the case in which the ES and the VaR constraint
are binding, we find that ES and VaR can still lead to identical solutions.
Corollary 5.1. Assume L ≤ D̂T in the optimization Problems 1 and 2:
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i) For each given α, there exists one (α) such that XV aRT = X
ES
T .
ii) For each given α, there exists one (α) such that piV aR = piES , where piV aR and piES denote
the optimal trading strategy, respectively.
Proof. Let us divide L ≤ D̂T into two intervals: L ≤ DT and DT < L < D̂T . We first
consider the case when L ≤ DT .
The two-region solution (4.1) in this case in Theorem 4.1 is: XEST = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ¯ .
The two-region solution (4.9) in this case in Theorem 4.2 is: XV aRT = (I(λαξT ) + DT )1ξT<ξ¯α .
Clearly, the two solutions are identical if ξ¯α = ξ¯ and λα = λ, where ξ¯α is defined through
P (ξT > ξ¯α) = α and ξ¯ is defined through E[ξTL1ξT>ξ¯ ] = . Therefore, for each given α, we
first calculate ξ¯α and then set (α) := E[ξTL1ξT>ξ¯α ]. With the same initial wealth x0, we must
have λα = λ. Therefore, for each α, there exists one unique (α) such that X
V aR
T = X
ES
T .
Next, consider the three-region (4.2) solution in Theorem 4.1 given by XES = (I(λξT ) +
DT )1ξT<ξL˜
+ L1
ξL˜ ≤ξT<ξ¯ , On the other hand, X
V aR
T = (I(λαξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξL˜
+ L1
ξL˜≤ξT<ξ¯α is
the three-region solution (4.10) in Theorem 4.2. In addition, ξ¯α and ξ¯ are defined in the same
way as in the case of the two-region solution. ξL˜ is defined as U
′
(L˜ − (DT − L))/λα and ξL˜ is
defined through U
′
(L˜− (DT −L))/λ. We first calculate ξ¯α and choose ξ¯ such that ξ¯(α) = ξ¯α.
With the same initial wealth x0, we know that λα = λ, which implies that ξ
L˜ = ξL˜ . Hence,
for each given α, there exists one (α) such that XV aRT = X
ES
T . (4.3) and (4.11) are obviously
equivalent with the same initial wealth.
As the financial market is complete, every contingent claim can be perfectly replicated with
a unique self-financing portfolio. Therefore, we obtain that for each given α, there is one (α)
such that piV aR = piES .
With a similar argument, we can show that the equivalence results also holds forDT < L ≤ D̂T .
In the following, we give an example to show how to specifically compute the equivalent sig-
nificance levels between VaR and ES. For simplicity, we consider a Black Scholes market with
only one risky asset with constant drift µ and volatility σ and one risk free asset with a con-
stant risk free rate r and a consequential constant market price of risk θ = (µ − r)/σ. The
dynamic of the unique state price density ξt is assumed to be dξt = −rξtdt− θξtdWt, ξ0 = 1,
where Wt is the one-dimensional standard Brownian motion. Therefore, we have that ξT =
exp(−(r + 0.5θ2)T − θWT ) and that ξT ∼ LN(−(r + 0.5θ2)T, θ2T ) is lognormally distributed.
For a given α, P (ξT > ξ¯α) = α is equivalent to
P (ξT ≤ ξ¯α) = P
(
ln(ξT ) + (r + 0.5θ
2)T√
Tθ
≤ ln(ξ¯α) + (r + 0.5θ
2)T√
Tθ
)
= 1− α.
Hence, ξ¯α = exp(Φ
−1
1−α
√
Tθ − (r + 0.5θ2)T ), where Φ−11−α is the quantile of a standard normal
distribution at 1− α. Next, we calculate the corresponding (α). We have that
(α) = E[ξTL1ξT>ξ¯α ] = L exp(−rT )
(
1− Φ
(
Φ−11−α − θ
√
T
))
.
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By Corollary 5.1, we know that with a given α and the corresponding (α), Problem 1 and
Problem 2 have the same solution.
We establish the equivalence according to the following procedure: (a) We first obtain
ξ¯α through P (ξT > ξ¯α) = α.
6 (b) Then we calculate the corresponding (α) by (α) =
E[ξTL1ξT>ξ¯α ]. In other words, if we choose (α) as determined in (b), we obtain ξ¯ = ξ¯α.
Table 1 contains the parameter we use for numerical illustration.
DT gt µ r σ T γ
100 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.2 1 0.5
Table 1: We consider the power utility function: U(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ .
Table 2 contains some significance levels for VaR- and ES-constraint leading to the same portfolio
choice. In the most extreme case, the portfolio insurance (α = 0) is equivalent to  = 0.
VaR (α) ES (% of initial wealth: /x0)
0.5% 0.87%
1% 1.70%
5% 6.82%
Table 2: The equivalence between VaR and ES.
This table shows the equivalent expected shortfall as a percentage of the initial wealth with respect to a VaR constraint in
non-concave optimization assuming L = 0.9DT . Other parameters are taken from Table 1.
The above example illustrates how to obtain the equivalent ES constraint with respect to a
VaR constraint such that the optimal terminal wealth stays unchanged assuming L ≤ D̂T . This
procedure is similar when starting with a given ES constraint. When the regulatory threshold
is below the tangent point D̂T , the financial institution is forced to reallocate the wealth dis-
tribution in the complete default region in order to satisfy the constraint. Further, the optimal
wealth with or without additional risk constraint of a surplus-driven financial institution always
jumps to zero (complete default) in the worst financial states. This enables us to calculate the
probability of the severe loss and the magnitude of the expected significant loss at the same
time. In addition, the worst financial states (complete default regions) are only determined by
the given risk constraint (unlike the ES-solution in Basak and Shapiro [2001] and the ES-solution
when L > D̂T in our model). Hence, with a given VaR constraint, there exists an ES constraint
leading to the same optimal investment strategy for a surplus-driven company assuming L ≤ D̂T .
The surplus-driven investor in general shows a gambling behaviour. The additional risk
constraint diminishes the probability of a total default without preventing it. In particular, the
ES constraint shows the same regulatory effect as a VaR constraint. Hence, when the passive
strategy which only invests the minimum amount needed to satisfy the risk constraint comes
to force, we obtain the equivalence between a VaR constraint and an ES constraint. Further,
6Note that this procedure does not depend on ξT having a log-normal distribution but is the same for any
complete financial market.
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this equivalence implies the ineffectiveness of an ES constraint to protect the liability holders
considering the surplus-driven behavior of a financial institution.
If the regulatory threshold L is larger than D̂T , the situation is different (Theorems 4.1 and
4.2). As D̂T > DT , the regulatory threshold in this case might be substantially larger then the
debt level DT . This case is less likely to occur in practice and implies a rather strict regulation.
We know that the non-concave function we consider, is not globally concave but locally concave.
The corresponding concave envelope coincides with the concave part of the initial non-concave
utility function on the domain XT > D̂T . When the regulatory threshold L is set larger than
D̂T , the risk constraint largely affects the terminal wealth distribution in the concave part (see
equations (4.7) and (4.15)). In this sense, a strict regulator intervenes more in the financial
institution’s portfolio planning problem. Hence, when L > D̂T , we observe a similar structure
of the optimal solution as Basak and Shapiro [2001] except for the worst financial states.
In summary, we conclude that when L ≤ D̂T an ES constraint has the same regulatory
effect as a VaR constraint, namely the regulation forces the surplus-driven company to reduce
the probability of a total default but cannot prevent the occurrence of a total default. When
L > D̂T , the concave part dominates the non-concave part in the problem, and consequently the
regulatory constraint shows a similar effect as in the standard constrained concave optimization
problem.7 Further, in none of the cases can the regulatory constraint prevent the surplus-driven
company’s gambling behavior thoroughly, but it does control the probability of a complete
default effectively.
Due to the equivalence result, we just plot the ES-constrained optimal wealth when L ≤ D̂T
in Figure 4, and Figure 5 plots both the VaR- and ES-constrained wealth when L > D̂T . We
can see from Figure 4(a), (b), (c) that in good financial states (small ξT ) the constrained wealth
is significantly lower than the benchmark wealth. This shows that the financial institution
has sacrificed some surplus in the booming financial market in order to satisfy the regulatory
constraint by investing more in the worse financial states. The “sacrifice” is less obvious in
Figures 4(d) and 5. The reason is that the financial institution is wealthier (has more initial
wealth) in these situations.
7This solution exists when the initial wealth of the company and the regulatory threshold are both very high.
In this case, the complete default occurs with a probability smaller than the regulatory level α.
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Figure 4: Optimal terminal wealth under an ES constraint when L ≤ D̂T .
This figure plots the constrained optimal three-region (a), (c) and the two-region wealth (b), (d), respectively. In (a) and
(b) we assume  to be 0.87% of the initial wealth x0 = 100, which implies α = 0.5% in the equivalent VaR-constraint. In (c)
and (d) we assume that L = 1.2DT and  = 0.98%x0 which implies α = 0.5% in the equivalent VaR-constraint. Further,
we assume that the initial wealth x0 = 120 in (c) and x0 = 200 in (d). Other parameters are chosen according to Table 1.
Figure 5: Optimal terminal wealth when L > D̂T .
The figure plots the constrained optimal terminal wealth when L > D̂T . (a) corresponds to the four-region wealth under an
ES constraint assuming  is 1.04% of the initial wealth. (b) and (c) correspond to the three-region VaR-constrained wealth
and four-region VaR-constrained wealth with α = 0.5%. Further, we assume that L = 250 in each case, x0 = 250 in (a) and
(b), and x0 = 600 in (c). Note that in (c), the unconstrained solution jumps to zero with a probability which is already less
than 0.06%. Other parameters are chosen according to Table 1.
6 The optimal trading strategy with a CRRA utility function
Heretofore, we solve the asset allocation problem of a surplus-driven financial institution facing
an ES or a VaR constraint in a complete market. We further establish the equivalence result
between an ES and a VaR constraint assuming L ≤ D̂T . In this section we provide the opti-
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mal trading strategy considering a CRRA utility function. Due to the equivalence result, we
only compute the ES-constrained strategy when L ≤ D̂T while providing both VaR- and ES-
constrained optimal strategies when L > D̂T . In addition, we use the benchmark strategy for
comparison. For simplicity we consider the same Black Scholes market as in Table 1.
Proposition 6.1. The benchmark case
(a) At t < T , the optimal benchmark wealth is given by
XBt = (λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt)), (6.1)
while the optimal benchmark strategy is given by
piBt =
θ
σγ
+
exp(−r(T − t))
XBt
(
D̂TΦ
′
(j(ξD̂T /ξt))
σ
√
T − t −
θ
σγ
DTΦ(j(ξ
D̂T /ξt))
)
.
(b) When t→ T , then piBt → θσγ
(
XBT −DT
XBT
)
if ξt < ξ
D̂T , and piBt →∞ if ξt > ξD̂T ,
where j(y) = ln(y)+(r+1/2θ
2)(T−t)
θ
√
T−t − θ
√
T − t, j(y, c) = j(y) + 1cθ
√
T − t,
exp(v(γ)) = exp
(− (r+ θ2/2)(T − t)(1−1/γ) + 12θ2(1−1/γ)2(T − t)), Φ is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function and Φ
′
is the derivative function of Φ.
Proposition 6.2. The ES-constrained case
When L ≤ DT :
(a) At t < T , if ξ¯ > ξ
L˜
 , the optimal ES-constrained wealth is given by
XESt =(λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξL˜ /ξt, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξL˜ /ξt))
+ Lexp (−r(T − t)) (Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt))− Φ(j(ξL˜ /ξt))),
while the optimal ES-constrained strategy is given by
piESt =
θ
σγ
+
exp(−r(T − t))
XESt
{
L˜Φ
′
(j(ξL˜ /ξt)) + LΦ
′
(j(ξ¯/ξt))
σ
√
T − t
− θ
σγ
(
DTΦ(j(ξ
L˜
 /ξt)) + L(Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt))− Φ(j(ξL˜ /ξt)))
)}
.
(b) If ξ¯ ≤ ξL˜ , the optimal wealth is given by
XESt = (λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ¯, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt)),
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while the optimal ES-constrained strategy is given by
piESt =
θ
σγ
+
exp(−r(T − t))
XESt
(
Φ
′
(j(ξ¯/ξt))((λξ¯)
−1/γ +DT )
σ
√
T − t −
θ
σγ
DTΦ(j(ξ¯/ξt))
)
.
When DT < L ≤ D̂T :
(a) At t < T , if ξ¯ > ξ, the optimal ES-constrained wealth is given by
XESt =(λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ

, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξ/ξt)),
+ Lexp(−r(T − t))(Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt))− Φ(j(ξ/ξt))),
while the optimal ES-constrained strategy is given by
piESt =
θ
σγXESt
(λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ

, γ)) +
Lexp(−r(T − t))Φ′(j(ξ¯/ξt))
σXESt
√
T − t .
(b) If ξ¯ ≤ ξ, the optimal wealth is given by
XESt = (λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ¯, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt)),
while the optimal ES-constrained strategy is given by
piESt =
θ
σγ
+
exp(−r(T − t))
XESt
(
Φ
′
(j(ξ¯/ξt))((λξ¯)
−1/γ +DT )
σ
√
T − t −
θ
σγ
DTΦ(j(ξ¯/ξt))
)
.
When L > D̂T :
(a) At t < T the optimal ES-constrained wealth is given by
XESt =(λξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ

/ξt, γ)) +DT exp (−r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξ/ξt))
+ Lexp (−r(T − t)) (Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt))− Φ(j(ξ/ξt))),
+ ((λ − λ2 )ξt)−1/γexp(v(γ))
(
Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))− Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt, γ))
)
+DT exp (−r(T − t))
(
Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt))− Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt))
)
,
while the optimal ES-constrained strategy is given by
piESt =
θ
σγXESt
exp(v(γ))
(
(λξt)
−1/γΦ(j(ξ

/ξt, γ)) + ((λ − λ2 )ξt)−1/γ(Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))− Φ(j(ξ¯/ξt, γ)))
)
+
exp(−r(T − t))
XESt σ
√
T − t
(
LΦ
′
(j(ξ¯/ξt)) + D̂T (Φ
′
(j(ξD̂T /ξt))− Φ
′
(j(ξ¯/ξt)))
)
.
21
Proposition 6.3. The VaR-constrained case
When L > D̂T :
(a) At t < T , if ξ¯α < ξ
D̂T , the optimal VaR-constrained wealth is given by
XV aRt =(λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ
α
/ξt, γ)) +DT exp(−r(T − t))Φ(j(ξα/ξt))
+ Lexp(−r(T − t))(Φ(j(ξ¯α/ξt))− Φ(j(ξα/ξt)))
+ (λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))
(
Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))− Φ(j(ξ¯α/ξt, γ))
)
+DT exp(−r(T − t))
(
Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt))− Φ(j(ξ¯α/ξt))
)
,
while the optimal VaR-constrained strategy is given by
piV aRt =
θ
σγXV aRt
(λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ
α
/ξt, γ)) +
Lexp(−r(T − t))Φ′(j(ξ¯α/ξt))
σXV aRt
√
T − t
+
θ
σγXV aRt
(λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))(Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))− Φ(j(ξ¯α/ξt, γ)))
+
D̂T exp(−r(T − t))Φ′(j(ξD̂T /ξt))
σXV aRt
√
T − t −
((λαξ¯α)
−1/γ +DT )exp(−r(T − t))Φ′(j(ξ¯α/ξt))
σXV aRt
√
T − t .
(b) If ξ¯α ≥ ξD̂T , the optimal wealth is given by
XV aRt =(λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ
α
/ξt, γ)) +DT exp(−r(T − t))Φ(j(ξα/ξt))
+ Lexp(−r(T − t))(Φ(j(ξ¯α/ξt))− Φ(j(ξα/ξt)))
while the optimal VaR-constrained strategy is given by
piV aRt =
θ
σγXV aRt
(λαξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξ
α
/ξt, γ)) +
Lexp(−r(T − t))Φ′(j(ξ¯α/ξt))
σXV aRt
√
T − t .
The above propositions are shown in the E-companion.
The pre-horizon optimal wealth in Figure 6(a) shows that the constrained wealth is below
the benchmark wealth in good financial states, but is larger than the benchmark wealth in most
intermediate states, while ending up with zero as the benchmark wealth in the worst financial
states. This implies that the regulatory constraint not only affects the terminal wealth distribu-
tion but also controls the risky behaviour in between. Hence, in general, the risk constraint will
force the surplus-driven company to insure at least the regulatory threshold in a large part of
the intermediate financial states and reduce the probability that the complete default happens.
Merton [1969] shows that a CRRA utility maximizer invests a constant fraction in the risky
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asset assuming the price of the asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. The fraction invested
in the risky asset also represents the volatility of the portfolio. We can see from Figure 6(b)
that the volatility of the portfolio is mostly smaller than the Merton constant in the good and
intermediate states but is far above the Merton constant in the worst financial states. This
is because in the worst financial states, the financial institution reduces the risky asset in the
portfolio. At the same time the value of the whole portfolio is decreasing in ξT and faster than
the value of the risky asset in the portfolio. Therefore, the fraction of the wealth invested in the
risky asset tends to infinity in the worst financial states.
In addition, we also plot the relative risk exposure in Figure 6(c), which is defined as the
volatility of the constrained portfolio divided by the volatility of the benchmark portfolio.8 We
can see that in good financial states (low ξT ) the volatility of the constrained portfolio converges
to the volatility of the benchmark portfolio. While in most financial states, the volatility of the
constrained portfolio is far below the volatility of the benchmark portfolio. This implies that the
risk constraint is effective to restrict the risky behavior of a surplus-driven financial company.
Figure 7(e) plots the three-region solution in the case L > D̂T , which preserves the same
property as the case L ≤ D̂T while the four-region VaR-constrained solution in Figure 7(f) is
an exception. We can see that the VaR-constrained strategy is more risky than the benchmark
strategy. The reason is that with the current parameters the probability of the benchmark
wealth being zero is less than 0.06% which is even smaller than α. This case is only possible
when both the regulatory threshold and the initial wealth level are very high. In this special
case, the concave part of the utility dominates the non-concave part in the optimization problem.
Hence, the relative risk exposure shows a similar shape as Basak and Shapiro [2001].
8The relative risk exposure shown in Figures 6(c) and 7 is a direct numerical illustration based on the param-
eters in Table 1. Due to many different groups of cases, we decided to leave out the detailed calculation in order
to avoid unnecessary redundancy.
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Figure 6: Pre-horizon ES-constrained wealth, strategy and risk exposure when L ≤ DT .
This figure plots (a) the pre-horizon optimal wealth, (b) strategy pit and (c) relative risk exposure under an ES constraint.
We assume that  = 0.87%x0 which is equivalent to α = 0.005. Other parameters are fixed as in Table 1. The horizontal
line in (b) refers to the Merton constant (θ/σγ).
Figure 7: Pre-horizon VaR-constrained wealth, strategy and risk exposure when L > D̂T .
This figure plots the relative risk exposure under a VaR constraint. We assume that L = 250 and α = 0.005. Further, we
assume that x0 = 250 in (e), and x0 = 600 in (f). Other parameters are fixed as in Table 1.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal asset allocation problem of a surplus-driven financial institution
facing a VaR or ES constraint, which mathematically corresponds to a constrained non-concave
optimization problem. We solve this optimization problem analytically. Depending on the rela-
tionship between the regulatory threshold and the debt level, the structure of the solutions varies,
which is different from the concave optimization with a VaR or an ES constraint. The analytical
solutions given in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 explicitly indicate that VaR and ES-based regulation
on the one hand reduces the default probability of a surplus-driven financial company and on
the other hand cannot prevent the occurrence of a complete default (i.e., holding zero terminal
wealth). Furthermore, Corollary 5.1 shows that in most relevant cases (i.e., when the regulatory
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threshold L is smaller than the tangent point D̂T of the debt level), a VaR and an ES constraint
have the same regulatory effect leading to the same terminal wealth and consequently identical
investment behavior. This implies that an ES-based regulation is not superior to a VaR-based
regulation considering the surplus-driven characteristic of a financial company. In addition,
the numerical analysis in Section 6 illustrates that the fraction invested in the risky asset of
almost all constrained portfolios never surpasses the benchmark portfolio, while the volatility
of both the constrained and unconstrained portfolio converges to infinity in the worst financial
states.
An interesting extension would be to analyse the non-concave optimization with multiple VaR
or multiple ES constraints. Especially one could examine whether the equivalence result still
holds in such a dynamic setting. Another relevant topic could be to investigate the influence
of the VaR or ES-based regulation in a general equilibrium setting considering the gambling
behavior of surplus-driven financial companies. We will leave these topics for future research.
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A E-companion to“On the Equivalence between Value-at-Risk
and Expected Shortfall in non-concave Optimization”
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. For a fixed and positive y, we have that c(y) := U(x(y) − d) − U ′(x(y) − d)x(y) =
U(I(λy)) − λyI(λy) − λyd since U ′(x(y) − d) ≡ λy holds for the conjugate function, denoting
by I the inverse function of the first derivative of U . Since the utility function is defined on the
positive real line and therefore c(y) is a decreasing function in y. The first statement in Lemma
3.1 follows. Next we prove the third and the fourth statement in Lemma 3.1.
Let I(λy) = z and rewrite c(y) as U(z) − U ′(z)z − U ′(z)d. From the Inada and the AE
condition we have that
lim
z→∞U(z)− U
′
(z)z − U ′(z)d = lim
z→∞U(z)
(
1− U
′
(z)z
U(z)
)
− U ′(z)d > 0, (A.1)
lim
z→0
U(z)− U ′(z)z − U ′(z)d = lim
z→0
U(z)
(
1− U
′
(z)z
U(z)
)
− U ′(z)d < 0. (A.2)
In addition, c(y) is a continuous function and hence by the intermediate value theorem for each
positive d, c(y) has a zero root. Hence, the third statement in Lemma 3.1 follows.
We have ∂c∗(y)/∂y = λ(λ2lλ − x) but the monotonicity of the function in y is not clear. We
know that there is a one-to-one relationship between x and y in the conjugate function through
x = I(λy) + d. We can see that when s < 0, λ(λ2lλ − x) = λ(s − I(λy)) < 0. Therefore, h is a
decreasing function in y. We can write the conjugate function as U(I(λy))− λy(I(λy)− s). It
follows from the fourth statement in Lemma 3.1 that c∗(y) has a unique zero root. Hence, we
proved the fourth statement in Lemma 3.1.
For the convenience of the later proof, we formulate the following lemma.
Lemma A.1.
Defining a new conjugate function cν(y) := sup
x>d
{U(x + d) − xλy} = U(x(y) + d) − U ′(x(y) +
d)x(y) = U(I(λy))− λyI(λy) + λyd, cν(y) decreases on (0, U ′(d)/λ), increases on (U ′(d)/λ,∞)
and hence has the minimum value U(d).
Proof. It is ∂cν(y)/∂y = −λx, and x ≡ I(λy) − d holds for the conjugate function cν(y).
Therefore, x > 0 if y < U
′
(d)/λ and vice versa since I is a strictly decreasing function in y.
Hence, cν(y) is a decreasing function in y when y < U
′
(d)/λ and reverses to an increasing
function in y when y > U
′
(d)/λ. Thus, the conjugate function obtains its minimum conjugate
at y = U
′
(d)/λ which is U(d). We proved Lemma A.1.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. L ≤ DT
We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x0 ≥ x10) the optimal solution (4.3)
coincides with the benchmark solution.
In the following we consider the case xmin0 ≤ x0 < x10. We use the point-wise Lagrangian
technique to prove this theorem. First, we show that (4.1) and (4.2) are the argmax of the
corresponding static Lagrangian. Due to Lemma A.2 we can choose two Lagrangian multipliers
to satisfy the budget constraint and the ES-constraint jointly. The static Lagrangian is
φ(XT ) = U((XT −DT )+)− λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT )1XT<L
=
U(XT −DT )− λξTXT if XT > DT ,−λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT )1XT<L if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT .
The Lagrangian is a function with two parts. The first part attains its maximum at I(λξT )+DT .
The second part is a negative affine function and obtains its maximum values at 0 or at the
jump point L since λ2 < λ. Further, we have φ(0) = −λ2ξTL > φ(L) = −λξTL. Therefore, 0
is the local maximizer of the second part. Moreover, we can see that
φ(I(λξT ) +DT )− φ(0) = U(I(λξT ))− λξT I(λξT )− λξTDT + λ2ξTL
= max
XT
{
U(XT −DT )−XTλξT + λξT λ2
λ
L
}
. (A.3)
Lemma 3.1 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the zero root of (A.3).
In addition, when L ≤ DT , we have that λ
(
λ2
λ
L−DT
)
< λ(L−DT ) ≤ 0. Therefore, if λ2 < λ,
there is a zero root of (A.3).
In particular, when λ2 tends to 0, (A.3) uniformly converges to max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλξT }
(whose zero root is ξD̂T ) on each compact set, and thus the zero root of (A.3) converges to ξD̂T .
When λ2 tends to λ, (A.3) uniformly converges to max
XT
{U(XT − DT ) − XTλξT + λξTL}(
whose zero root is ξL˜ ), and the zero root of (A.3) converges to ξ
L˜
 . Note that if x0 ≥ x10, (4.3) is
the optimal solution meaning that x0 = E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −DT )ξT /ξD̂T ) + DT )1ξT<ξD̂T ] ≥ x
1
0 =
E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T − DT )ξT /ξ¯) + DT )1ξT<ξ¯ ]. This further implies ξD̂T ≥ ξ¯. On the contrary,
ξ¯ > ξ
D̂T when x0 < x
1
0. Hence, if ξ¯ ≤ ξL˜ , λ2 is chosen such that ξ¯ is the zero root of (A.3).
Thus, we proved that (4.1) is the argmax of the static Lagrangian.
In the case ξ¯ > ξ
L˜
 , we set λ2 = λ. Then, the affine part of the Lagrangian is constant on
XT < L. This means that both L and 0 can be the local maximizer in the affine part. Moreover,
φ(I(λξT ) +DT )− φ(L) = U(I(λξT ))− λξT I(λξT )− λξTDT + λξTL
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλξT + λξTL}. (A.4)
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We know from Lemma 3.1 that (A.4) has a unique zero root which is denoted by ξL˜ . Hence,
(4.2) is the argmax of the Lagrangian.
L > DT
We know that when x0 is large enough (L > D̂T and x0 ≥ x20 or DT < L ≤ D̂T and x0 ≥ x30)
the optimal solution (4.6) coincides with the benchmark solution. In the following we consider
the case when the optimal solution does not coincide with the benchmark solution.
By Lemma A.2 we can choose two Lagrangian multipliers λ and λ

2 to satisfy two constraints
jointly. The static Lagrangian is
φ(XT ) = U((XT −DT )+)− λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT )1XT<L
=

U(XT −DT )− λξTXT if L < XT ,
U(XT −DT )− λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT ) if DT < XT ≤ L,
−λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT ) if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT .
We first prove that the solutions given by Theorem 4.1 are the argmax of Lagrangian in the
respective cases.
The Lagrangian has four possible local maximizers: I(λξT ) +DT on the first part, I((λ −
λ2)ξT ) +DT or the jump point L on the second part, 0 on the third part.
If ξT < ξ we have that I(λξT ) +DT > L, and the Lagrangian increases continuously from
DT to I(λξT ) +DT except possibly at L and decreases from then on. If ξT ≥ ξ¯, we have that
I((λ−λ2)ξT )+DT < L. The Lagrangian increases continuously from DT to I((λ−λ2)ξT )+DT
and decreases from then on except possibly at the jump point L.
By Lemma 3.1 we know that on ξT < ξ,
φ(I(λξT ) +DT )− φ(L) = U(I(λξT ))− λξT I(λξT ) + λξT (L−DT )− U(L−DT ) > 0,
and on ξT ≥ ξ¯ we have that
φ(I((λ − λ2)ξT ) +DT )− φ(L)
=U(I((λ − λ2)ξT ))− (λ − λ2)ξT I((λ − λ2)ξT )− (λ − λ2)ξTDT
+ (λ − λ2)ξTL− U(L−DT ) > 0.
If ξ

≤ ξT < ξ¯, we have that I(λξT ) +DT ≤ L < I((λ − λ2)ξT ) +DT , and the Lagrangian
increases from DT to the jump point L and decreases from then on. Hence, L is the maximizer.
Therefore, the maximizer X
′
T of the Lagrangian defined on XT > DT is
X
′
T = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξ
+ L1
ξ

≤ξT<ξ¯ + (I((λ − λ

2)ξT ) +DT )1ξT≥ξ¯. (A.5)
Next, we only need to compare the maximum given by (A.5) with φ(0) in different regions
to determine the global maximizer.
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On ξT < ξ, we have that
φ(I(λξT ) +DT )− φ(0) = U(I(λξT ))− λξT I(λξT )− λξTDT + λ2ξTL
= max
XT
{
U(XT −DT )−XTλξT + λξT λ

2
λ
L
}
. (A.6)
Lemma 3.1 provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the zero root of
(A.6). Denoting the zero root as ξ1 and we have that I(λξT ) + DT is the global maximizer if
ω ∈ {ξT < ξ}
⋂{ξT < ξ1}.
Similarly on ξ

≤ ξT < ξ¯, we have that φ(L) − φ(0) = U(L − DT ) − λξTL + λ2ξTL and
ξ2 = U(L−DT )/(λ − λ2)L is the zero root. Therefore, if ω ∈ {ξ < ξT < ξ¯}
⋂{ξT < ξ2}, L is
the global maximizer.
Further, on ξT ≥ ξ¯, we get that φ(I((λ − λ2)ξT ) + DT ) − φ(0) = U(I((λ − λ2)ξT )) −
(λ − λ2)ξT I((λ − λ2)ξT )− (λ − λ2)ξTDT of which the zero root is ξD̂T . Hence, if ω ∈ {ξT >
ξ}
⋂{ξT < ξD̂ }, I((λ−λ2)ξT ) +DT is the global maximizer. In any other case, 0 is the global
maximizer.
For the sake of clarity, we formulate a table of all the important values of ξT .
ξ

:= ξ := ξ
D̂T :=
U
′
(L−DT )/λ U ′(L−DT )/(λ − λ2) U
′
(D̂T −DT )/λ
ξ1 := ξ2 := ξD̂T :=
zero root of (A.6) U(L−DT )/L(λ − λ2) U
′
(D̂T −DT )/(λ − λ2)
The utility function is concave on x > DT . Assuming L > D̂T we have that ξ
1 > ξD̂T > ξ

,
ξD̂T > ξ¯ and ξ
2 > ξ¯ . This implies that {ξT < ξ}
⋂{ξT < ξ1} = {ξT < ξ}, {ξ < ξT <
ξ¯}⋂{ξT < ξ2} = {ξ < ξT < ξ¯}, and {ξT > ξ¯}⋂{ξT < ξD̂T } = {ξD̂T > ξT > ξ¯}. Therefore,
(4.7) is the argmax of the Lagrangian in this case.
If L ≤ D̂T , we have that ξD̂T < ξ¯. Hence, {ξT > ξ¯}
⋂{ξT < ξD̂T } = ∅, and then I((λ −
λ2)ξT ) +DT cannot be the maximizer.
In addition, we know that ξ1 > ξ2 holds because
0 =U(L−DT )− λξ2L+ λ2ξ2L
= max
XT
{
U(XT −DT )−XTλξ1 + λξ1λ

2
λ
L
}
> U(L−DT )− λξ1L+ λ2ξ1L.
If ξ¯ < ξ, λ

2 is chosen such that ξ
1 = ξ¯. If ξ¯ ≥ ξ, λ2 is chosen such that ξ2 = ξ¯. We have
proved that (4.4) and (4.5) are the argmax of the Lagrangian, respectively.
Now we show that Theorem 4.1 is the optimal solution. Suppose there exists another feasible
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solution YT . Consider
E
[
U
(
(XEST −DT )+
)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]
=E
[(
U(XEST −DT )+
)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]− λx0 + λx0 − λ2+ λ2
≥E[(U(XEST −DT )+)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]− E[λξTXEST ] + E[λξTYT ] (A.7)
− E[λ2ξT (L−XEST )1XEST <L] + E[λ2ξT (L− YT )1YT<L]
=E
[
max
XT
{
U
(
(XT −DT )+
)− λξTXT − λ2ξT (L−XT )1XT<L}]
− E[U((YT −DT )+)− λξTYT − λ2ξT (L− YT )1YT<L] ≥ 0. (A.8)
The inequality (A.7) holds because the optimal solution satisfies both constraints with equality.
The last inequality (A.8) is due to the fact that the optimal solution is the argmax of the static
Lagrangian. The proof is complete.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. L ≤ DT
We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x0 ≥ x40) the optimal solution (4.11)
coincides with the benchmark solution . In the following we focus on the case when xmin0 ≤
x0 < x
4
0. We use the point-wise static Lagrangian technique. We first show that (4.9) and
(4.10) are the argmax of the static Lagrangian in different cases. By Lemma A.2 we use two
positive Lagrangian multipliers λα and λ˜2 to capture the initial wealth constraint and the VaR
constraint, respectively.
Case 1: ξL˜ ≥ ξ¯α
In this case, we want to show the argmax of the static Lagrangian is (4.9). The static Lagrangian
is
φ(XT ) = U((XT −DT )+)− λαξTXT − λ˜21XT<L
=
U(XT −DT )− λαξTXT if XT > DT ,−λαξTXT − λ˜21XT<L if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT ,
where λ˜2 = −(U(I(λαξ¯α))− λαξ¯αI(λαξ¯α)− λαξ¯αDT ).
Note that if x0 ≥ x40, (4.11) is the optimal solution meaning that x0 = E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T −
DT )ξT /ξ
D̂T ) + DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
] ≥ x40 = E[ξT (I(U
′
(D̂T − DT )ξT /ξ¯α) + DT )1ξT<ξ¯α ]. This further
implies ξD̂T ≥ ξ¯α. Therefore, ξ¯α > ξD̂T when x0 < x40, and hence λ˜2 is positive by Lemma 3.1.
The first part of the Lagrangian attains its maximum U(I(λαξT ))−λαξT I(λαξT )−λαξTDT
at I(λαξT ) + DT . The second part may attain its maximum value −λ˜2 at 0 or −λαξTL at the
jump point L.
We search the global maximum of the Lagrangian through comparing the local maximums.
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We first compare φ(I(λαξT ) +DT ) and φ(L). We have that
φ(I(λαξT ) +DT )− φ(L) = U(I(λαξT ))− λαξT I(λαξT )− λαξTDT + λαξTL
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξT + λαξTL}. (A.9)
By Lemma 3.1, (A.9) has a unique zero root which is obtained by ξL˜ = U
′
(L˜− (DT − L))/λα.
L˜ is the corresponding tangent point with respect to DT − L. Further, φ(I(λαξT ) +D) > φ(L)
in the region ξT < ξ
L˜ as Lemma 3.1 gives that the conjugate function is a decreasing function
of ξT .
In addition, we have that
φ(I(λαξT ) +DT )− φ(0)
=U(I(λαξT ) +DT )− λαξT I(λαξT )− λαξTDT + λ˜2
=U(I(λαξT ) +DT )− λαξT I(λαξT )− λαξTDT − (U(I(λαξ¯α))− λαξ¯αI(λαξ¯α)− λαξ¯αDT )
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξT } −max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξ¯α}. (A.10)
From Lemma 3.1, we know that (A.10) is positive in the region ξT < ξ¯α and negative
otherwise. We only need to compare φ(0) and φ(L) in the region ξT > ξ¯α. We have that
φ(0)− φ(L) = −λ˜2 + λαξTL
= (U(I(λαξ¯α))− λαξ¯αI(λαξT )− λαξ¯αDT ) + λαξTL
> (U(I(λαξ¯α))− λαξ¯αI(λαξT )− λαξ¯αDT ) + λαξ¯αL
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξ¯α + λαξ¯αL} > 0.
The last inequality holds because of Lemma 3.1 and ξ¯α < ξ
L˜. Thus, we have proved that (4.9)
is the global maximizer in this case.
Case 2: ξL˜ < ξ¯α
In this case, we want to show that the argmax of the static Lagrangian is (4.10).
The static Lagrangian is
φ(XT ) =
U(XT −DT )− λαξTXT if XT > DT ,−λαξTXT − λ2α1XT<L if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT ,
where λ˜2 = λαξ¯αL.
Again the first part attains its maximum U(I(λαξT ))−λαξT I(λαξT )−λαξTDT at I(λαξT )+
DT . The second part may attain its maximum value −λ˜2 at 0 or −λαξTL at the jump point L.
We know from (A.9) that φ(I(λαξT ) + DT ) > φ(L) in the region ξT < ξ
L˜. Moreover,
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φ(L)−φ(0) = λα(ξ¯α−ξT )L > 0 in the region ξT < ξ¯α. Therefore, (4.10) is the global maximizer
of the static Lagrangian.
Remark 4. L = DT implies that ξ
L˜ is ∞. Hence, this case is naturally nested in the case
ξL˜ > ξ¯α.
L > DT
We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x0 > x
5
0) the optimal solution (4.17)
coincides with the benchmark solution. In the following we consider the case when xmin0 ≤ x0 <
x50. We first prove that (4.15) and (4.16) are the argmax of the Lagrangian respectively. By
Lemma A.2 we can choose two positive Lagrangian multipliers λα and λ˜2 to satisfy the initial
wealth constraint and the VaR constraint jointly.
Case 1: ξ¯α < ξ
D̂T
The static Lagrangian is,
φ(X) =
U(XT −DT )− λαξTXT − λ˜21XT<L if XT > DT ,−λαξTXT − λ˜2 if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT ,
where λ˜2 = U(I(λαξ¯α))−λαξ¯αI(λαξ¯α) +λαξ¯α(L−DT )−U(L−DT ). λ˜2 is non-negative by the
third statement in Lemma 3.1.
The first part of the static Lagrangian obtains its local maximums φ(I(λαξT ) + DT ) at
I(λαξT ) +DT or φ(L) at the jump point L. The second part obtains its local maximum φ(0) at
0 since it is a negative affine function.
If ξT < ξα, we know from Lemma 3.1 that
φ(I(λαξT ) +DT )− φ(L) =U(I(λαξT ))− λαξT I(λαξT ) + λαξT (L−DT )− U(L−DT )
= max
XT
{U(XT + L−DT )−XTλαξT } − U(L−DT ) > 0.
In addition, since ξ
α
< ξ¯α < ξ
D̂T we have that
φ(I(λαξT ) +DT )− φ(0) =U(I(λαξT ))− λαξT I(λαξT )− λαξTDT + λ˜2
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξT }+ λ˜2 > 0.
Hence, in this region I(λαξT ) +DT is the global maximizer.
If ξT > ξα, then on ξα < ξT < ξ¯α we have that
φ(I(λαξT ) +DT )− φ(L)
= U(I(λαξT ))− λαξT I(λαξT )− λαξTDT − λ˜2 − U(L−DT ) + λαξTL
= max
XT
{U(XT + L−DT )−XTλαξT } −max
XT
{U(XT + L−DT )−XTλαξ¯α} < 0.
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Otherwise, φ(I(λαξT ) + DT ) − φ(L) is larger than 0. Moreover, assuming ξ¯α < ξD̂T , we have
that
φ(L)− φ(0) = U(L−DT )− λαξTL+ λ˜2
= U(I(λαξ¯))− λαξ¯αI(λαξ¯α) + λαξ¯α(L−DT )− λαξTL
> U(I(λαξ¯α))− λαξ¯αI(λαξ¯α) + λαξ¯α(L−DT )− λαξ¯αL
= max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξT } > 0.
Hence, L is the global maximizer on ξ
α
< ξT < ξ¯α.
In addition, φ(I(λαξT ) + DT ) − φ(0) = U(I(λαξT )) − λαξT I(λαξT ) − λαξTD − λ˜2 + λ˜2 =
max
XT
{U(XT −DT )−XTλαξT } > 0 on ξ¯α < ξT < ξD̂T . Thus, (4.15) is the argmax of the static
Lagrangian in Case 1.
Case 2: ξ¯α > ξ
D̂T
The static Lagrangian is
φ(X) =
U(XT −DT )− λαξTXT − λ˜21XT<L if XT > DT ,−λαξTXT − λ˜2 if 0 ≤ XT ≤ DT ,
where λ˜2 = λαξ¯αL− U(L−DT ).
λ˜2 is non-negative because the utility function is always dominated by the tangent line which
intersects the origin and the corresponding tangent point. Therefore, we have U(L − DT ) <
λαξ
D̂TL < λαξ¯αL assuming ξ¯α > ξ
D̂T . Hence, λ˜2 > 0.
The static Lagrangian can attain its local maximums at I(λαξT ) + DT , or at L or 0. We
compare the differences of the local maximum values to locate the global maximizer.
We have that φ(L)−φ(0) = (ξ¯α−ξT )λαL > 0 on ξT < ξ¯α. If ξT > ξα, φ(I(λαξT )+D)−φ(L) <
λα(ξT − ξ¯α)L < 0 holds on ξT < ξ¯α. In addition, φ(0) > φ(I(λαξT ) + DT )holds on ξT > ξ¯α
assuming ξD̂T < ξ¯α. Thus, we have proved that (4.16) is the argmax of the Lagrangian.
Now we show that Theorem 4.2 indeed gives the optimal solution. Suppose there exists
another feasible solution YT . We have that
E
[
U
(
(XV aRT −DT )+
)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]
=E
[
U
(
(XV aRT −DT )+
)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]− λαx0 + λαx0 − λ˜2α+ λ˜2α
≥E[U((XV aRT −DT )+)]− E[U((YT −DT )+)]− E[λαξTXV aRT ] + E[λαξTYT ]
− E[λ˜21XV aRT <L] + E[λ˜21YT<L]
=E
[
max
XT
{U((XT −DT )+)− λαξTXT − λ˜21XT<L}]
− E[U((YT −DT )+)− λαξTYT − λ˜21YT<L] ≥ 0.
Therefore, Theorem 4.2 is proved.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. The optimal terminal wealth is given by Theorem 3.1, which is XBT = (I(λBξT ) +
DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
. We know that ξTX
B
T is a P-martingale. Hence, we have that
XBt = E
[
ξT
ξt
XBT |Ft
]
.
In addition, we know that ξTξt is log-normally distributed. To be more precise,
ξT
ξt
= exp(−(r + θ2/2)(T − t)− θ(WT −Wt)) ∼ LN(−(r + θ2/2)(T − t), θ2(T − t)).
We consider the power utility function x
1−γ
1−γ . Therefore, the inverse function of U
′
is x−1/γ .
Based on these observations, we have the following
XBt = E
[
(λBξt)
−1/γ(
ξT
ξt
)1−1/γ1
ξT<ξ
D̂T
|Ft
]
+DT · E
[
ξT
ξt
1
ξT<ξ
D̂T
|Ft
]
= (λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt, γ)) +DT · exp (−(r(T − t)) Φ(j(ξD̂T /ξt)).
Remark 5.
(
ξT
ξt
)1−1/γ
is log-normally distributed, namely
(
ξT
ξt
)1−1/γ
= exp(−(r + θ2/2)(T − t)(1− 1/γ)− θ(1− 1/γ)(WT −Wt))
∼ LN(−(r + θ2/2)(T − t)(1− 1/γ), θ2(1− 1/γ)2(T − t)).
Remark 6. For a log-normally distributed random variable Y ∼ LN(µ, σ2), the expectation
E[Y 1a<Y <b] is given by exp(µ + 1/2σ
2)(Φ(j(b)) − Φ(j(a)), where Φ is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function and j(x) = ln(x)−(µ+σ
2)
σ .
Remark 7. In a two-asset Black Scholes model, the dynamic of the wealth process is given by
dXt = (r + pit(µ− r))Xtdt+ pitσXtdWt, X0 = x0.
Using Remark 5 and Remark 6, we obtain (6.1). Next, we apply Itoˆ’s lemma to obtain the
optimal strategy. We omit the term corresponding to dt and just focus on the term with respect
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to dWt. We have then that
dXBt = · · · dt+
(
θ
γ
(λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(x(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))
+ (λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ
′
(x(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))
1√
T − t
+DT · exp(−r(T − t))Φ′(x(ξD̂T /ξt)) 1√
T − t
)
dWt
= · · · dt+
(
θ
γ
(λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(x(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))
+ D̂T · exp(−r(T − t))Φ′(x(ξD̂T /ξt)) 1√
T − t
)
dWt.
The following remark will be useful.
Remark 8. If Y ∼ LN(µ, σ2), then Y 1−1/γ ∼ LN((1− 1/γ)µ, (1− 1/γ)2σ2) with a positive γ.
For a positive λ
(λY )−1/γ exp((1− 1/γ)µ+ 1/2(1− 1/γ)2σ2) = Φ
′
(j(b))
Φ′(j(b) + 1/γσ)
exp(−r(T − t))(λb)−1/γ ,
where j(b) is defined in Remark 6.
With Remark 8, we can get the following equation
(λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ
′
(x(ξD̂T /ξt, γ))
1√
T − t = (λBξ
D̂T )−1/γΦ
′
(x(ξD̂T /ξt))
1√
T − texp(−r(T − t)).
By the definition of ξD̂T := U
′
(D̂T −DT )/λ, we have that (λBξD̂T )−1/γ = D̂T −DT . Therefore,
we can obtain the term which corresponds above to the diffusion part,
piBt =
θ
σγ
(λBξt)
−1/γexp(v(γ))Φ(x(ξD̂T /ξt, γ)) +
D̂T
σ
· exp(−r(T − t))Φ′(x(ξD̂T /ξt)) 1√
T − t
=
θ
σγ
XBt +
exp(−r(T − t))
σ
√
T − t D̂TΦ
′
(x(ξD̂T /ξt))− θ
σγ
DT · exp(−r(T − t))Φ(x(ξD̂T /ξt)).
The last equation holds by rearranging the first term and making the dependence of the strategy
on XBt explicit. We make use of the following remark to explain the last argument in Proposition
6.1.
Remark 9. Y ∼ LN(µ, σ2), with j(b) defined in Remark 6, we have that when σ → 0,
i) if y < b, j(b/y)→∞, Φ′(j(b/y))→ 0 and Φ(j(b/y))→ 1;
ii) if y > b, j(b/y)→ −∞, Φ′(j(b/y))→ 0 and Φ(j(b/y))→ 0.
Using Remark 9, we can obtain the last conclusion in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.3 and Proposition 6.2 can be obtained similarly.
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A.5 Proof of the existence of Lagrangian multipliers
Lemma A.2. In the constrained optimization problem for any given feasible initial wealth
(x0 ≥ xmin0 ), the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers exist such that the budget constraint
and the risk constraint are binding simultaneously.
We classify all the optimal solutions we obtained into two groups. The first group contains
solutions which depend only on the budget Lagrangian multiplier. The second group contains
solutions which depend on two Lagrangian multipliers. We see that all the optimal solutions
with constraints belong to the first group except for the ES-solution in the case L > D̂T . In the
first group, the second Lagrangian multiplier can be chosen as a function of the first Lagrangian
multiplier assuming the risk constraint is binding. Therefore, as long as we show that the budget
Lagrangian multiplier exists, the second Lagrangian multiplier exists as well.
Proof. We first show that the budget Lagrangian multiplier in the first group of solutions
exists. Take the two-region ES-constraint solution XES(λ, ξT ) = (I(λξT ) + DT )1ξT<ξ¯ in the
case L ≤ DT for example.
We will show that the map ϕ : λ  E[ξTXES(λ, ξT )] is a strictly decreasing, continuous
and surjective function from (0,∞) to (xmin0 ,∞).
To see that the function ϕ is a strictly decreasing function is equivalent to showing that for
all λ1 > λ2 > 0, ϕ(λ1) < ϕ(λ2). Define l(λ) := (I(λξT ) + DT )1ξT<ξ¯ . Then we have ϕ(λ1) =
E[ξT l(λ1)] and ϕ(λ2) = E[ξT l(λ2)]. We know that I(λξT )+DT is a strictly decreasing function
in λ almost surely. Hence, we conclude that l(λ1) ≤ l(λ2) and P (l(λ1) < l(λ2)) > 0 as long
as {ξT < ξ¯} is not an empty set. Further, we have ϕ(λ1) = E[ξT l(λ1)] < E[ξT l(λ2)] = ϕ(λ2).
Thus, ϕ is a strictly decreasing function.
It is easy to see that l(·) is a continuous function except for countable many points. Therefore,
ϕ is a continuous function in λ.
In addition, if λ tends to ∞ then ϕ(λ) tends to xmin0 and if λ tends to zero then ϕ tends
to ∞. Therefore, ϕ is a strictly decreasing, continuous and surjective function from (0,∞) to
(xmin0 ,∞). Hence, for each fixed x0 ≥ xmin0 , there exists a unique λ satisfying the budget
constraint with an equality.
From equation (A.3), we choose λ2 =
−(U(I(λξ¯))−I(λξ¯)λξ¯−λξ¯DT )
ξ¯L
such that the ES-
constraint is binding.
The other cases in the first group can be proved with similar arguments.
Next we prove that two Lagrangian multipliers exist simultaneously such that the budget
constraint and the ES constraint are binding simultaneously if L > D̂T .
In the first step of the proof we want to show that for a fixed λ and for 0 < λ2 ≤ λ, the
second constraint always holds.
If λ2 tends to λ, ξ¯ := U
′
(L −DT )/(λ − λ2) converges to ∞. Hence, the optimal solution
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converges to
XES =
I(λξT ) +D if ξT < ξ,L if ξ

≤ ξT .
This implies that E[(L − XEST )ξT1XEST <L] −  = − < 0, which obviously satisfies the ES
constraint. If λ2 = 0, the optimal solution converges to
XES = (I(λξT ) +DT )1ξT<ξD̂T
,
which is the benchmark solution. Since x0 < x
2
0 we have that E[(L−XEST )ξT1XEST <L]−  > 0.
For a fixed given λ, E[(L−XEST )ξT1XEST <L]−  is a continuous and decreasing function in λ2
and thus bijective. By the intermediate value theorem, the zero root of the function exists. We
represent the zero root to be λ2(λ), a function of λ.
Denoting by X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T the optimal terminal wealth, we have that
E[X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T ξT ] =E[X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T ξT1XEST <L
] + E[X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T ≥L
]
=LE[ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T <L
]− + E[XES,λ,λ2(λ)T ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T >L]
+ E[XEST ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T =L
]
=LE[ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T <L
]− + E[XES,λ,λ2(λ)T ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T >L]
+ E[LξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T =L
]
=− + E[LξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T ≤L] + E[X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T >L
]
=LE[ξT ] + E[(X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T − L)ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T >L]− 
=Le−rT − + E[(XES,λ,λ2(λ)T − L)ξT1XES,λ,λ2(λ)T >L].
Since by equation (4.7) we have 1
X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T >L
= 1ξT<U ′ (L−DT )/λ , we can see that when λ
tends to zero, X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T converges to ∞ and E[XEST ξT ] converges to ∞. On the other hand
when λ tends to ∞, E[XEST ξT ] converges to Le−rT − .
Moreover, E[XEST ξT ] is a continuous function in λ and thus as long as x0 > Le
−rT − , by
the intermediate value theorem there exists λ such that E[X
ES,λ,λ2(λ)
T ξT ] = x0.
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